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Abstract 
The changes observed in resourcing international organisations over the last decades may have 
dramatic consequences for their ability to fulfil their mandates. This paper investigates into how 
far reaching the expected changes really are, and whether the new types and sources of financial 
and human resources can really be considered as causal for these developments. It appears that 
resourcing may not be the initial cause, but contributes to the centrifugal dynamics currently 
observed in the multilateral system. Administrative cost related to the new and complex funding 
structures are considerable, and ensuring transparency over resource flows represents a major 
challenge. Official decision making bodies lose power to sub-groups of members or external actors 
that fund parts of the organisations’ activities through separate channels. Given that the large 
volume of non-core funding and the lack of transparency, they cannot easily adjust their own 
priorities. It can thus not be expected that the funding of certain activities through external channels 
will simply be compensated by a corresponding reduction of core funding in this area. Whether 
this negatively affects the ability of the organisations to fulfil their mandates—and hence, 





This special edition has highlighted the diversity in the types and sources of financial and human 
resources available to international organisations, and how this diversity relates to variation in other 
areas, notably administrative processes in these organisations, their governance, and more 
generally, the organisations’ ability to fulfil their mandates. Many of the articles show a trend 
towards ever more diversity even within existing organisations, driven by a shift from mandatory 
towards voluntary funding, and by a proliferation of special purpose trust funds, in particular since 
the turn of the century. This process is embedded in a broader change of the international system 
with increasing numbers of (partially competing) organisations. This proliferation of organisations 
provides multiple options for funders willing to support any specific cause, as well as new choices 
for potential beneficiaries. The papers of this special edition equally show that these developments 
may have dramatic consequences for the future of the multilateral system as a whole (Goetz and 
Patz, this issue).  
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However, a sceptical reader may still be left with a few questions on the extent to which variation 
in resourcing—and especially the substantial changes with respect to the composition of funding 
observed in recent years—really matter in this respect. First, do these changes in resourcing really 
cause substantial developments such as changes in the power balance between different actors 
involved in the organisations? Or do we rather face an issue of reverse causality with changes in 
the power balance affecting the types and sources of financial and human resources? Or do both 
just happen in parallel, jointly driven by a general change in preferences of the actors involved? To 
establish the role of resourcing, a discussion of causality appears necessary here. 
Second, besides these doubts about causality, the reader may wonder about whether the effects 
involved are really relevant. Given the fungibility of at least part of the organisations’ resources 
(i.e. the possibility to shift them to other uses) administrative adjustment processes can take place. 
Hence, when some funders prioritise trust funds with a special focus, can the rest of the 
organisation’s budget not simply be adjusted accordingly by reducing the resources allocated to 
this field? In terms of new funding sources, the amount contributed by non-traditional funders 
appears relatively negligible. Does their involvement then make any difference? 
Third, the question arises whether, as a whole, the consequences of new trends in resourcing 
international organisations are positive or negative. Most of the articles in this special edition focus 
on potential problems and hence implicitly draw a rather gloomy picture of the future of the 
international system populated by international organisations unable to fulfil their goals due to lack 
of reliable funding for their core activities and related constraints with regard to experienced and 
motivated staff. But could the costs not be outweighed by the benefits?  
These three questions will be systematically discussed in the remainder of this concluding article 
based—wherever possible—on information from the different papers within the special edition, 
but augmented by related external literature on the development of the international system and 
public finance more generally, including findings from my own research.  
The objective is not to provide a comprehensive overview of all possible arguments and hence a 
final answer to all questions, but to place the discussion of resourcing international organisations 
in a more general perspective and to provide an initial normative assessment of the developments 
observed. Eventually, this analysis will further clarify the role of resourcing for the multilateral 
system. 
 
2. The tricky question of causality 
Let us start by examining the question of causality. This question is critical since the analysis of 
resourcing would lose much of its relevance if it were merely an effect rather than a cause of the 
change in multilateral governance more generally, or if both were simply driven simultaneously by 
a third factor so that their correlation would just be spurious. This third external factor could be a 
general shift in preferences related to the role of international organisations and hence the tasks 
that governments around the world expect these organisations to fulfil. Squatrito (this issue), who 
provides one of the few papers in this special edition with a focus on the determinants, rather than 
the effects of resourcing, suggests that domestic preferences—evidenced in her context by the 
design of national courts (“uploading of domestic norms”)—are an important driver of resourcing 
at the international level. It appears highly plausible that domestic preferences are relevant for 
resourcing decisions regarding other international organisations as well, and that resourcing in 
terms of volume, modalities and sources, may thus change when preferences change.  
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We find multiple indications for a general shift in preferences. On the one hand, there is an 
increasing frustration about what international organisations and multilateral agreements are able 
to deliver; on the other hand, there is an increasing belief that from a national perspective, designing 
policies without caring for their international effects may be more beneficial. The latter is most 
strikingly evidenced by the recent success of nationalist parties that deny the benefits of 
international burden sharing for the provision of global public goods and promote mercantilist 
policies based on the beggar-thy-neighbour perspective prominent before World War II. Frustration 
about the failure of the multilateral system to deliver the expected results is also omnipresent, both 
in the political discourse and in scholarly contributions. As noted by Weder di Mauro (2017:10) 
with respect to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States as its largest 
shareholder: “they seem to have lost the interest in their powerful position [within the IMF] as 
much as their belief in a global economic order based on the community of nations and on rules”.ii 
She further describes how the IMF generally became increasingly out of favour, notably through 
its austerity policy in the context of the Asian crisis. As a consequence, fifteen Asian countries 
created a new alliance—a new international organisation based in Singapore—to provide an 
alternative to the IMF in case of future crises. In the context of the Euro crisis, the IMF had to join 
forces with the European Central Bank and the newly created European Stability Mechanism given 
that its own resources were way too limited. The reading of this story could be as follows: 
governments start mistrusting a given international organisation, and hence, they create alternatives 
and eventually spread their funding over different institutions.  
Noticeably, the new institutions created are often less global in their membership than the existing 
ones. It seems that national governments increasingly prefer smaller clubs with members of more 
homogeneous preferences. For instance, while the World Trade Organisation stagnates due to the 
deadlock of the Doha Round, over a hundred of new bi- and small multilateral trade agreements 
have been negotiated (Cole and Guillin 2015: Figure 1). This trend is discussed in more detail in 
the literature on “minilateralism” (Kahler 1992; for more recent contributions see e.g. Naim 2009, 
Eckersley 2012, Patrick 2015 or Falkner 2016, see also Graham this issue). 
Graham’s (2015) historical account of the development of voluntary funding within the United 
Nations or Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Eichenauer’s (2015: 529f.) discussion of the development 
of special purpose trust funds can be interpreted along the same lines, but for developments within 
rather than around existing organisations. Individual member countries are dissatisfied with the 
general orientation or efficiency of an organisation and are hence unwilling to provide reliable 
long-term and unconditional funding. Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Eichenauer also relate this trend 
to the end of the Cold War and the need for governments of donor countries to increase the 
efficiency and visibility of their contributions to increasingly critical national constituencies. 
Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Knack (2017) show that even the specific type of trust funds chosen 
by a contributing state (single-donor trust funds versus medium-sized and large multi-donor trust 
funds) depends on the optimisation of donor preferences along these lines. Bilateral interests 
thereby enter increasingly—and often quite invisibly—into the multilateral system. This is exactly 
what Sridhar and Woods (2013) have coined as “Trojan multilateralism”. Do we observe a general 
“bilateralisation” of international organisations that eventually obviously also affects resourcing? 
There is also considerable evidence that the lack of trust in existing international organisations 
leads to increasing expectations in other actors such as the private sector, civil society, or sub-
national government entities such as cities to solve problems more effectively. In the context of 
international climate policy, for instance, these expectations have been voiced prominently in the 
run up to the Paris Conference in 2015, both by the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-
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moon, and by the French President François Hollande (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017a: 130). 
Simultaneously, an academic literature has developed on city networks and other transnational 
climate governance initiatives that include a variety of different actors (see notably Bulkeley et al. 
2014, Andonova, Roger and Hale 2017). More generally, the development of transnational 
governance initiatives has attracted a lot of scholarly interest reflected in a significant number of 
in-depth studies in recent years (for a review, see Roger and Dauvergne 2016). Much of this 
literature can be interpreted as a search for alternatives or at least complements to the traditional 
multilateral system, which is increasingly considered as dysfunctional. Scholarly research thereby 
reflects the perspective we observe in the political discourse. 
If traditional actors are increasingly mistrusted, and expectations are put on new actors in the game, 
it is highly plausible that, at least after some time, this will also affect the allocation of funding. 
Indeed, in some areas of international development or international climate policy for instance, 
attracting a large amount of private funding seems to be directly equated with increased efficiency. 
Attracting private funding has therefore become an objective in itself (Stadelmann, Castro and 
Michaelowa 2011). A recent evaluation of the public-private partnership (PPP) programme for 
German development aid notes that the development related synergies of such PPP-projects are 
often significantly overestimated, based on the belief that private firms primarily seek cooperation 
due to increased social responsibility (DEval 2017: 78). At the same time the potential divergence 
of entrepreneurial and development-related interests is typically ignored (DEval 2017: 32, 59, 79). 
Whether this is rationally justifiable or not, all of this points to a general willingness to move away 
from traditional solutions in order to try out other approaches involving different actors (see also 
Westerwinter 2016). The changes in resourcing international organisations highlighted in this 
special edition are consistent with this general trend. Traditional international organisations with 
broad-based memberships receive an increasingly smaller share of reliable public funding for their 
core activities, while funding goes to new and smaller organisations, often with diverse 
membership, or to pre-identified subfields within an existing organisation through short-term 
voluntary funding earmarked to specific activities. These organisations thereby also open up to 
non-state actors who participate in the resourcing process and in the setting of new priorities. 
Are the changes observed in resourcing hence nothing else than part of a general trend? The way I 
argued above deliberately turns the thrust of the argument of most articles in this special edition on 
its head to show that indeed, resourcing could also be seen as a consequence of this general trend. 
However, the theoretical arguments made in the papers of this volume are equally convincing: The 
power of international organisations depends on their financial and human capabilities (Heldt and 
Schmidtke this issue). Organisations without reliable long-term financing and—relatedly—with 
less experienced and possibly less qualified and motivated staff (or rather “non-staff”, see Ege and 
Bauer this issue) should thus be even less able to fulfil their mandates to the satisfaction of their 
member states. They spend time and effort searching for additional resources, competing with other 
organisations, and coordination as well as monitoring of all the diverse activities becomes a major 
issue for the organisations’ leadership (Graham, this issue, Reinsberg this issue, and Bergmann and 
Fuchs this issue regarding accounting problems). The diversity of funding sources further implies 
a diversity of principals with diverging preferences, and hence a dilution of the core mandate (e.g. 
through a collusion between individual principals and the organisations’ implementing staff, see 
Eckhard and Dijkstra this issue), which may lead to further dissatisfaction of some of the member 
states, and to an erosion of democratic governance structures within international organisations 
(Browne this issue, Graham this issue, Martens and Seitz this issue, Reinsberg this issue, Goetz 
and Patz this issue). In addition Goetz and Patz (2016) and Patz and Goetz (2017) highlight the 
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theoretical parallels to findings in comparative public administration. This literature focuses on 
national administrations and observes procedural changes driven by budget cuts directly related to 
general economic downturns or financial crises, i.e. to changes in resourcing that are more 
plausibly exogenous. 
What do we draw from this discussion? It seems that, theoretically, a causal relationship in both 
directions is plausible. Squatrito (this issue) equally adopts this perspective. Taking the different 
theoretical arguments together, this suggests that the impact of political governance on resourcing 
and the impact of resourcing on political governance are mutually reinforcing. We can hence 
imagine the dynamics as a spiralling up with changes in preferences leading to changes in 
multilateral governance and related changes in resourcing international organisations, which in turn 
reduce their ability to deliver, and thus affect government preferences in favour of alternative 
actors, changed governance structures and new channels of funding. From this perspective, while 
resourcing may not stand at the very beginning of the causal chain, it appears to be key for the 
long-term dynamics to unfold.  
From this perspective, the disentangling of how much of the overall change can be attributed to the 
different factors, i.e., in particular, how much exactly is due to resourcing, may appear less relevant. 
Attempts to do so empirically in a comprehensive way are prone to fail as we lack a valid 
counterfactual. Only in exceptional (and very specific) cases can we observe changes in resourcing 
that are plausibly exogenous and hence allow us to isolate the causal effect of resourcing. 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2017b) use the example of the fee on projects of the Clean 
Development Mechanism introduced in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. These fees exploded 
due to a completely unexpected development of the private market for certified emission 
reductions, which created a large amount of unforeseen funding for a specific part of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat. The econometric 
analysis shows that this change in resourcing significantly affected the influence of the secretariat. 
In a broader study, Ege and Bauer (this issue) examine the effect of an increase in voluntary funding 
on staff numbers and on the share of non-permanent staff. Their analysis reduces the risk of 
endogeneity by (a) lagging voluntary funding by three years (reducing the risk of reverse causality), 
and (b) controlling for a (potentially common) linear trend (reducing the risk of simultaneous 
causation). However, some bias may remain. Given the lack of plausible instrumental variables 
and the impossibility of experimental studies in the context of resourcing international 
organisations, some ambiguity will always remain. Most empirical results can be interpreted only 
as correlations, and while they consistently show the relevance of financial resources and their 
composition, the extent to which resourcing contributes to the change of multilateral governance 
as a whole cannot be clearly identified.  
As there are obvious limitations of this type of analysis, we have to rely primarily on the theoretical 
arguments outlined above. In sum, resourcing may not be the initial cause of the developments we 
observe, but resourcing should be considered as an important factor for the spiralling up or—in 
other words—the centrifugal dynamics currently observed in the multilateral system. 
 
3. How much really changes in decision making and in administrative processes?  
Once we accept that resourcing causes (at least parts of) this change in multilateral governance, the 
question arises how sizeable these effects really are. Are they sizeable enough to be relevant? 
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The mechanisms of change suggested in the different papers of this special edition work through 
the effects of the new funding structure on (a) decision making processes within individual 
organisations, and (b) on their administrative processes.  
3.1. Decision making processes  
Regarding decision making processes, the key concern is that the allocation of funding is no more 
primarily determined by the formal decision making bodies of international organisations, but by 
the various actors providing funding outside the core budget, e.g. through trust funds or other forms 
of voluntary funding for specific purposes (Goetz and Patz this issue, Graham this issue, Browne 
this issue). This may hollow out the democratic rules elaborated in the organisations’ treaties and 
replace them with a new form of informal governance by both selected member states and external 
actors (Reinsberg this issue). We do indeed observe quite a difference between the allocation of 
voluntary funds and the allocation of core funding (for the example of the World Bank’s 
International Development Agency (IDA), see Reinsberg 2016: 121, for a comparison in the 
context of multilateral development aid more generally, see Reinsberg, Michaelowa and 
Eichenauer 2015: 541). Clearly, contributors to special purpose funds do intend to set new 
priorities. But at the end of the day, does this really change the overall allocation of funding in the 
field? Obviously, this depends on the degree of fungibility of resources. As I will explain below, it 
is a common misconception that earmarking prevents fungibility. Put simply, the reason is that 
funding decisions in one area can often be compensated by funding decisions elsewhere.  
This is a well-known phenomenon in the context of development assistance where over many 
years, donors have tried to condition their aid contributions to specific sectors—often without much 
success.iii Boone (1996: 291, 311), for instance, shows that while 32% of the aid flows in his sample 
were used for investment in economic infrastructure, the effect of aid on investment cannot be 
distinguished from zero except for those countries for which overall aid inflows are very large. 
This puzzling result has a simple explanation: Governments can adjust the use of their own budget 
to reach an overall allocation of spending in their country that corresponds to their preferences. 
Hence, when donors build a road, the government may just build one road less. Such adjustment 
processes can fully compensate the development priorities imposed by the donor unless aid 
becomes a relatively high share of the overall resources at a government’s disposal. 
The phenomenon is generally well known in public finance where we find textbook examples 
comparing the effect of an unconditional income transfer to the effect of in-kind (or otherwise 
clearly conditioned) contributions. Figure 1 adjusts the illustration by Frey and Kirchgässner 
(2002: 284) to our context of resourcing international organisations. Let us imagine an international 
organisation that allocates its budget to sectors 1 and 2, e.g., the World Bank providing loans for 
economic infrastructure (sector 1) and climate change mitigation (sector 2). The organisation’s 
executive board optimizes resource allocation to developing countries by choosing the highest level 
of utility (u0) it can reach with the given initial budget B0. This leads to an optimal combination of 
projects from both sectors (graphically shown at point x where the indifference curve of the 





Figure 1: Core funding versus earmarked contributions, small transfer 
 
Source: Frey and Kirchgässner (2002: 284), adjusted. 
Now imagine the organisation obtains an increase in core financing so that the budget constraint 
moves outward to B1. There is no restriction to the use of funding. The executive board will 
optimize again based on the new budget and can thereby reach point z on a substantially higher 
indifference curve (level of utility u2). Alternatively, let the same amount of additional funding be 
earmarked to sector 2 (or contributed to a climate trust fund). If the organisation just adds these 
additional climate projects to those it already funds at point x, it will reach point y. Since we assume 
that these projects cost as much as the initially discussed increase in core funding, this point 
requires the same budget as point z, namely B1. However, the utility for the international 
organisation will be less (u1<u2). But why should the organisation remain at that point? It can 
simply reduce its core funding to sector 2. As long as the conditional transfer is not larger than the 
total budget the organisation would have allocated to climate projects anyway, it can fully adjust 
by focussing its core funding on the other sector. In Figure 1, it could thereby again reach point z 
with utility level u2, and the effect of earmarked funding would not be any different from the effect 
of an increase in core funding.  
Note that the adjustment process will let core funding and earmarked resources (or resources for 
special trust funds) appear even more different than they would otherwise be. This is because the 
adjustment requires the executive board to focus on the funding of the complementary activity. In 
Figure 1, we see that point z, which the organisation would choose freely based on its core 
resources, has a well-balanced sector composition. However, to again reach point z with the 
contributions earmarked to climate change mitigation, the organisation will have to move its entire 
core funding to sector 1. This is because the way the figure is drawn, the conditional transfer is just 
as large as the cost for climate projects the organisation would have incurred on its own.  
Beyond this level, no further adjustment would have been possible. This is because the allocation 
to sector 2 must at least be as high overall as the conditional transfer. This is why for a lower level 
of climate change projects the budget restriction in case of the conditional transfer differs from the 
budget restriction for increased core funding. For the latter, the budget constraint corresponds to 
the (fully drawn) straight line B1. For conditional transfers, its starts as B1, but then moves to the 
left along the dashed line implying that up to point z, extra funding will only be available if used 
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for sector 2. In such cases, adjustments can only be partial and the final sectoral allocation will 
indeed differ from the preferred choice of the formal decision making body of the organisation. 
This situation is depicted in Figure 2 where the transfer is higher than in Figure 1 (B2>B1).  
 
Figure 2: Core funding versus earmarked contributions, large transfer 
 
Source: Frey and Kirchgässner (2002: 284), adjusted. 
In this case, with earmarked funding, the organisation cannot reach the same level of utility as with 
unconditional funding (u5). Point z (now at utility u4 due to the additional budget increase as 
compared to Figure 1) again shows the maximum possible adjustment while point y (now at utility 
u3) shows the situation if no adjustments takes place at all. 
This discussion underscores that to really affect the overall allocation of funding—and hence to 
undermine the power of the formal decision making authority of any individual international 
organisation—the earmarked contributions have to be large relative to the funding this particular 
area would have received anyway. This implies that either overall special purpose funding must be 
very high, or there must be very little funding in this particular area otherwise.  
The articles in this special edition suggest that indeed, overall funding for special purposes is very 
high. Referring to the OECD report by Tortora and Steensen (2014: 8), Graham (this issue) 
underscores that earmarked resources accounted for as much as 30% of overall contributions to 
multilateral organizations, with shares as high as 40% for the World Bank, and even 70% for United 
Nations agencies. In addition, one should note that the somewhat lower share of 30% overall is 
clearly driven by the fact that many new organisations have been created that are themselves so 
specialised that earmarking within is obviously irrelevant. Such organisations are in fact very 
similar to trust funds attached to other, broader international organisations. The Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) and the vaccine alliance GAVI for instance 
cover areas that fall in the broader range of activities of the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
(Browne this issue). Hence in the context of our theoretical argument, funding these vertical funds 
that have been accorded a formally independent status is substantially equivalent to funding a 
special purpose trust fund within the WHO or to providing funding earmarked to these areas 
directly to the WHO. Taking into account all these multiple direct and indirect ways to condition 
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the contributions to the multilateral system, the share of conditional resources would clearly rise 
way beyond 30%.  
In those policy areas in which fungibility prevents an imposed change in funding priorities, the 
shares are typically much smaller. For those developing countries, for which the relevant data are 
available, aid as a share of central government expenditure, for instance, amounted to 24% in 2015, 
whereby this mean was largely driven by a few outliers such as Afghanistan or West Bank and 
Gaza. The median is only 7% (World Bank 2017).  
In addition, earmarked funding to international organisations sometimes specifically focuses on 
areas that would clearly not receive any funding otherwise. Individual member countries often use 
trust funds to push new fields that would presumably become acceptable for the broader 
organisational membership only much later, or to fund areas that are too contentious to ever reach 
an agreement upon among all member states (Reinsberg this issue). At times, individual members 
even use trust funds to fund countries or areas explicitly excluded from the organisation’s mandate. 
For instance, a number of countries that are not eligible for IDA funding (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Mexico, Peru, Russia, and South Africa), or that cannot access World Bank funding due to 
lack of membership in the institution (e.g., West Bank and Gaza) do receive concessional funding 
by the different trust funds (World Bank 2014, Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Eichenauer 2015:330).. 
In these cases, individual members clearly use the means of trust funds to circumvent the 
organisation’s rules and regulations. There is no way for the formal decision making bodies of the 
organisation to compensate the funding of areas by a reallocation of their core budget.  
Finally, the whole discussion about compensating adjustments of the core budget assumes that the 
additional financial flows are sufficiently transparent. However, the opposite seems to be the case.iv 
With over 900 trust funds at a single organisation such as the World Bank (World Bank 2014), it 
is hard to keep an overview. As highlighted by Goetz and Patz (this issue) there is no clarity 
regarding the terminology used to describe the different types of financial flows even within a 
given family of organisations such as the United Nations, and budgeting practices are often 
inconsistent and unclear. Bergmann and Fuchs (this issue) provide an impressive review of these 
accountability problems and explain how individual organisations now slowly adjust their rules to 
include the necessary differentiation of their resources in the future.  
This implies that if at all the formal decision making boards of the international organisations can 
adjust, these adjustments will happen with a considerable time lag. Moreover, it remains to be seen 
whether even the revised accounting standards will allow for an overview that does not only include 
all resourcing channels within an organisation, but also the relevant transparency over the 
allocation of funding by other organisations in the same field to whose funding priorities this 
organisation may also want to adjust. Given the overall complexity of the system, this seems to be 
very hard to achieve. 
3.2. Administrative processes  
These issues regarding accountability lead us directly to the discussion of the relevance in terms of 
administrative processes. In this regard, there is little doubt that the consequences of the changes 
in the resourcing are daunting. The new resourcing system often includes various layers of 
delegation between member countries and different organisations responsible for management and 
finally implementation (see Michaelowa, Reinsberg and Schneider 2016, 2017 for the case of the 
EU). There are high administrative transaction costs to handle hundreds if not thousands of 
different funds with varying governance structures within a given organisation. The necessary 
administrative adjustments include the creation of monitoring systems preventing that some of 
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these funds take risks with consequences that will later fall back on the reputation of the 
organisation as a whole. They also include the introduction of mechanisms ensuring that trust funds 
are at least fully self-financing, i.e. covering the relevant overheads (IEG 2011). Finally, they 
include processes to ensure that individual departments of the organisation do not accept trust funds 
that may be problematic from the perspective of other departments, and processes to handle 
competition for funding arising between different units (for examples in the context of the World 
Bank, see Reinsberg 2017, and Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011: 263). Only slowly, 
organisations are now adjusting to these new challenges by undergoing corresponding 
administrative reforms, for instance by imposing some restrictions regarding the minimum funding 
volume for trust funds to be acceptable (Tortora and Steensen 2014). It is for a reason that the 
alumni organisation of the World Bank identified the proliferation of trust funds as one of the five 
major challenges the organisation will have to face (The 1818 Society 2012). 
In addition, the lack of reliable funding affects all mid- to long-term planning procedures. However, 
in this context, one might object that even in the context of core funding unexpected cuts may arise. 
The most prominent example is certainly the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) where the United States have withheld their core contributions ever since 
the organisation’s executive board admitted Palestine as a new member state in 2011 (Hüfner this 
issue). While this is an extreme case, funding delays by member states are a more common 
phenomenon and partially driven by domestic lobbying (Lavelle 2011). The fear that voluntary 
funding may create pro-cyclical spending, i.e. lead to the problem that funds will not be available 
when they are most needed (see Martens and Seitz this issue) may thus also affect “mandatory” 
funding. Empirically, so far, there is not much evidence for a greater pro-cyclicality of voluntary 
funding (Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Eichenauer 2015: 544f.). According to this study, one reason 
may be that governments may face constraints related to the expectations of their partner-
governments, national constituencies, or even domestic administrative processes that may prevent 
ad hoc funding adjustments. The problem of pro-cyclicality may be greater with non-governmental 
sources of funding, but as of now, they only represent a small portion of resources. Even in those 
few organisations like GAVI in which the number of non-governmental sources of funding is high, 
their contributions are mostly individually negligible as a share of total funding. The only notable 
exception is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) that provided more than 20% of 
GAVI’s budget (Browne this issue). It should be reasonable to assume that a private philanthropic 
organisation such as the BMGF does not depend on business cycles in the same way as business 
associations or other private firms. While from this perspective, voluntary funding may thus be less 
problematic than it could be, future developments in this area remain to be observed. An 
appropriate financial accountability system appears to be crucial to track these developments 
(Bergmann and Fuchs this issue).  
In addition, as demonstrated by Ege and Bauer (this issue), the increasing share of voluntary 
funding has already been followed by an increasing share of short-term employments in 
international organisations. This can be interpreted as a precautionary adjustment that may occur 
even if the apprehended funding cuts do not happen in practice. The authors point at the 
consequences this may have for staff experience, and the opportunity to recruit motivated and well-
qualified staff in the future. Interestingly, Heldt and Schmidtke (this issue) find rather little change 
in the organisation’s capabilities (including human capabilities) over time; if at all, they see a slight 
empowerment of international public administrations. At first glance, this may seem like a 
contradiction. However, the reason is that Heldt and Schmidtke focus on the development of 
resources in absolute terms, while Ege and Bauer consider the share of short-term relative to long-
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term staff. In addition, Heldt and Schmidtke consider the possibility of raising external funds by 
itself as an indicator for a more powerful organisation, following the idea that this possibility 
decreases the organisation’s dependency on a limited set of traditional members. This perspective 
is indeed different from the one, which Ege and Bauer adopt in their paper. This leads to a different 
interpretation of very similar information. 
In sum, the above discussion implies that adjustment requirements are considerable. In terms of 
governance over the allocation of funding, the formal decision making bodies may be able to 
compensate for some of the distortions of conditional resources. This is because they can adjust 
the allocation of their core funding, but they can do so only if the overall resourcing becomes 
sufficiently transparent, and—given the large share of non-core funding—they can do so only in a 
very limited way. Administrative cost related to the new and complex funding structures are 
considerable, even if the volatility of funding has so far been less than expected. Yet, one can also 
adopt a positive perspective on the developments of resourcing. The following section will focus 
on these normative considerations. 
 
4. Normative considerations 
We have seen that changes in resourcing come along with changes in power. As the contrast 
between Ege and Bauer on the one hand and Heldt and Schmidtke on the other hand shows, whether 
developments are good or bad lies in the eye of the beholder. While one focuses on the power of 
the organisation from the perspective of members as a collective principal, the other one focuses 
on the power of the international public administration standing in (potential) opposition to its 
members. Just as the general tendency towards minilateralism and towards a greater role for 
transnational governance initiatives, the developments in resourcing we observe tend to shift power 
from formal decision-making bodies of international organisations towards subgroups of members 
or individual members offering special contributions, and towards non-state public or private actors 
(Westerwinter 2016). Within international public administrations, power shifts happen from 
overall management towards individual units that benefit from external funding to build up their 
own turf (Reinsberg 2017, Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011). As highlighted by Heldt and 
Schmidtke (this issue), as a whole the international public administration benefits from greater 
independence of individual funders and funding mechanisms. However, since the diversity of funds 
usually comes hand-in-hand with reduced long-term commitment, the trade-off is not clear. Finally, 
the diversity of multilateral organisations and associated trust funds shifts some power towards the 
recipients of the organisations’ funding and services as recipient governments can benefit from the 
competition between the different organisations to obtain individually more advantageous deals, 
e.g. credits with less strings attached (Humphrey and Michaelowa 2013). 
What the power balance between the different actors should ideally look like and whether the 
observed power shifts are hence generally beneficial or detrimental is not easy to assess, and the 
answer depends on a number of assumptions. If we believe that the formal governance structures 
of international organisations are rather problematic because they are too slow to react to new 
developments and anyway democratic only at the surface (“democracy of dictators” in popular 
parlance), then the empowerment of subgroups of members or other actors may be helpful. By 
helping the organisation to effectively achieve its global objectives, the empowerment of the 
relevant sub-group of members may indirectly even increase the organisation’s legitimacy. It is no 
coincidence that activities to enhance good governance, for instance, are often financed through 
trust funds rather than through core funding. Such programmes would risk lengthy discussions in 
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the boards of an organisation such as the World Bank, and they would even partially be excluded 
by the organisation’s mandate (Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Knack 2017). Moreover, as highlighted 
by Graham (this issue), small coalitions of members tend to be more homogenous and can therefore 
act more rapidly in the case of emergencies like natural disasters or the outbreak of dangerous 
disease (IEG 2011: 6). Similarly, partnerships with private actors may be highly efficient in some 
cases. In principle, new funding mechanisms such as trust funds could also rectify the power 
structure embodied in the traditional allocation of voting rights in organisations like the World 
Bank, which many observers today consider as biased and undemocratic. De facto, however, the 
countries most concerned, notably the major emerging economies such as China, have not made 
much use of trust funds to increase their influence within the Bank. The total share of BRICS 
contributions within the World Bank’s multiple trust funds is just about 0.1% (World Bank 2014). 
Rather, these countries directly launched competing organisations, namely the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) (Humphrey 2015).  
The above examples show that the new resourcing mechanisms can be advantageous in certain 
ways, notably when some coalitions of actors push forward an agenda, which is globally beneficial. 
Yet, who guarantees that the “right” actors will be empowered? It may not always be democratic 
countries trying to promote democracy and human rights in non-democratic ones. How much are 
individual contributors of voluntary funding, be they public or private, really pursuing the primary 
objective to promote development, health, education, climate change mitigation, or whatever the 
overarching goals that the international community set out to pursue? Or are partially conflicting 
national objectives or special interests entering through the backdoor (Woods 2005, Sridhar and 
Woods 2012)? If this is the case, the legitimacy of international organisations will suffer.  
The problem of special interests entering through the backdoor may arise even more acutely in the 
context of private actors. As highlighted by Martens and Seitz (this issue), due to their direct access 
to people, Coca-Cola or L’Oréal may well be able to support the swift spread of information about 
how to save water or how to avoid HIV. This is creating clear benefits. However, at times the 
association with a United Nations organisation may also “greenwash” the image of an organisation 
that is otherwise rather opposed to the United Nations’ global objectives. If competition about 
funding becomes even fiercer, such problems will become more prominent. When international 
organisations continuously lend their own legitimacy to problematic partners, this very legitimacy 
will eventually erode. However, as mentioned above, for now, non-profit organisations, and 
notably the BMGF dominate the population of non-state contributors. In this case, the contributor’s 
goals largely correspond to the global development goals of the multilateral organisations, even 
though there may be differences in the valuation of different modes of intervention. Indeed, the 
goals of this type of private organisations may be better aligned with those of the international 
organisations than the goals of individual member governments seeking geopolitical and 
commercial benefits.  
Finally, what about the empowerment of (parts of) the international bureaucracy vis-à-vis the 
member states? Again, the judgement depends on who more strongly pursues the global goals (see 
also Ege and Bauer this issue). This may well be the staff, since they often self-select into an 
organisation because they are attracted by precisely these goals (Anderfuhren-Biget, Häfliger and 
Hug 2013). The situation is then similar to the case of an empowerment of philanthropic funding 
organisations. However, if the staff that is empowered primarily seeks to maximise its budget, 
autonomy or discretionary power, the situation is different. In such cases, the focus may easily shift 
away from core activities, and move towards wherever money is available. This can also lead to an 
increased take-up of activities that could equally be handled by private companies, and hence lead 
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to competition with the private sector. If the multilateral organisations’ activities benefit from direct 
or indirect subsidies, efficient private business activities may be crowded out (see Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa 2011 for examples in the context of the World Bank).  
In sum, if those actors are empowered who are highly motivated to work towards the core global 
goals of the international community, this should generally strengthen the organisations’ 
effectiveness with respect to these goals and thereby also increase their legitimacy. If not, the 
opposite is the case. The result of the process is not yet clear. Overall, the balance of power has not 
necessarily shifted away from those actors that strive for global as opposed to individual benefits. 
However, there seem to be no safeguards in place to prevent such a shift in the future. The lack of 
transparency due to the overall complexity of the system—with the resulting difficulty to hold 
anyone responsible—increases the risk of unobserved adverse developments in this respect. 
The shift of power to the beneficiaries of the international organisations’ programme funding and 
services is a slightly different, but equally ambiguous issue. On the one hand, it may limit the 
funding agency’s ability to condition the transfer of resources to necessary policy reforms or to 
enforce important safeguards. This is problematic if the recipient government is not development 
oriented and wishes to use the funds for private rather than public benefits. This is one of the 
reasons why—ever since the Paris Declaration in 2005—donors of international development 
assistance have generally agreed to reduce aid fragmentation. However, if the recipient government 
is prioritising development, a deal that better matches its own interests and its own development 
strategy, and hence increases ownership, will be useful. In this case, an increased choice between 
different donors may be beneficial. Correspondingly, the recent literature on donor fragmentation 
is more nuanced and distinguishes between situations in which the presence and potential 
competition between donors may be detrimental, and other cases in which it may be conducive to 
development (Gehring et al. 2017).  
 
5. Conclusions 
Recent developments in the resourcing of international organisations may have dramatic 
consequences for the future of the multilateral system. To be sure, this paper starts by re-examining 
the question of causality. While other drivers—notably a general disillusionment about the ability 
of established international organisations to solve the most pressing global problems—also 
contribute to the centrifugal dynamics we observe, the new forms of resourcing contribute to 
accelerating this process. Within this process, the formal decision making bodies of international 
organisations lose power, while individual members or smaller member coalitions as well as non-
state actors gain considerable influence over the allocation of programme funds. While adjustments 
of the core budget can partially compensate for the new funding earmarked to specific activities, 
this adjustment requires substantial transparency, which is difficult to reach given the complexity 
of the system, with thousands of individual trust funds and multiple layers of delegation. In 
addition, core funding has become such a small share of the overall budget in many organisations 
that the scope for adjustments is limited. The administrative requirements to manage and monitor 
the new and complex system are daunting.  
Nevertheless, it is not yet entirely clear whether these developments will help or hinder the 
international organisations in their pursuit of the global goals set out in their mandates. While we 
observe clear power shifts, the balance of power has not necessarily shifted away from those actors 
that strive for those global goals. However, there seem to be no safeguards in place to prevent such 
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a shift in the future. The lack of transparency within the current system increases the risk of adverse 
developments in this respect. It also prevents a clear assignment of responsibilities. 
 
References 
Anderfuhren-Biget, Simon, Ursula Häfliger and Simon Hug (2013): Values of staff in international 
organizations, in: Robert Reinalda (ed.): Handbook of international organizations, Routledge, 
London. 
Andonova, Liliana, Charles Roger and Thomas Hale (2017): The comparative politics of 
transnational climate governance, International Interactions 43(1) (special edition). 
Bergmann, Andreas and Sandro Fuchs (this issue): Accounting standards for complex resources of 
international organizations, Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Birchler, Kassandra, Sophia Limpach and Katharina Michaelowa (2016): Aid modalities matter: 
The impact of different World Bank and IMF programs on democratization in developing 
countries, International Studies Quarterly 60(3): 427-439. 
Boone, Peter (1996): Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid, European Economic Review 
40(2), 289-329. 
Browne, Stephen (this issue): Vertical funds: New forms of multilateralism, Global Policy, 
forthcoming. 
Bulkeley, Harriet, Liliana Andonova, Michele M. Betsill, Daniel Compagnon, Thomas Hale, 
Matthew Hoffmann, Peter Newell, Matthew Paterson, Charles Roger and Stacy VanDeveer (2014): 
Transnational climate governance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Cole, Matthew T. and Amélie Guillin (2015): The determinants of trade agreements in services vs. 
goods, International Economics 144(4): 66–82. 
DEval (2017): Evaluierung des DeveloPPP.de-Programms, Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Bonn, https://www.deval.org/de/evaluierungsberichte.html 
(accessed 26 April, 2017). 
Eckersley, Robyn (2012): Moving forward in the climate negotiations: Multilateralism or 
minilateralism? Global Environmental Politics 12(2): 24-42. 
Eckhard, Steffen and Hylke Dijkstra (this issue): Implementation games: Member states’ unilateral 
influence on peacebuilding policy in Kosovo, Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Ege, Jörn and Michael W. Bauer (this issue): How financial resources affect the autonomy of 
international public administrations, Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Falkner, Robert (2016): A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, 
club benefits, and international legitimacy, Perspectives on Politics 14(1): 87-101. 
Frey, Bruno and Gebhard Kirchgässner (2002): Demokratische Wirtschaftspolitik, Verlag Vahlen, 
München. 
Gehring, Kai, Katharina Michaelowa, Axel Dreher and Franziska Spörri (2017): Aid fragmentation 
and effectiveness: What do we really know? World Development, forthcoming. 
15 
 
Goetz, Klaus and Ronny Patz (2016): Pressured budgets and the European Commission: towards 
a more centralized EU budget administration? Journal of European Public Policy 23(7): 1038-
1056. 
Goetz, Klaus and Ronny Patz (this issue): Resourcing international organizations – an introduction, 
Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Graham, Erin (2015): Money and multilateralism: How funding rules constitute IO governance, 
International Theory 7(1): 162-194. 
Graham, Erin (this issue): Financing, multilateralism & governance at international organizations, 
Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Heldt, Eugénia and Henning Schmidtke (this issue): Measuring the empowerment of international 
organizations: The evolution of financial and staff capabilities, Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Hüfner, Klaus (this issue): The financial crisis of UNESCO after 2011: Political reactions and 
organizational consequences, Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Humphrey, Chris (2015): Development revolution or Bretton Woods revisited? The prospects of 
the BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Overseas 
Development Institute Working Paper 418, ODI, London. 
Humphrey, Chris and Katharina Michaelowa (2013): Shopping for development: Multilateral 
lending, shareholder composition and borrower preferences, World Development 44(4): 142-155. 
IEG (2011): Trust fund support for development: An evaluation of the World Bank’s trust fund 
portfolio, Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank, Washington. 
Kahler, Miles (1992): Multilateralism with small and large numbers, International Organization 
46(3): 681-708. 
Lavelle, Kathryn C. (2011): Multilateral cooperation and congress: The legislative process of 
securing funding for the World Bank, International Studies Quarterly 55(1): 199-222. 
Martens, Jens and Karolin Seitz (this issue): Philanthrolateralism: Private funding and corporate 
influence in the United Nations, Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Michaelowa, Axel and Katharina Michaelowa (2011): Climate business for poverty reduction? The 
role of the World Bank, Review of International Organizations 6(3-4): 259-286.  
Michaelowa, Katharina and Axel Michaelowa (2017a): Transnational climate governance 
initiatives: Designed for effective climate change mitigation? International Interactions 43(1): 
129-155. 
Michaelowa, Katharina and Axel Michaelowa (2017b): The growing influence of the UNFCCC 
Secretariat on the clean development mechanism, International Environmental Agreements 17(2): 
247-269. 
Michaelowa, Katharina, Bernhard Reinsberg and Christina Schneider (2016): Multi-bi aid in 
European development assistance: The role of capacity constraints and member state politics, 
Development Policy Review, online first, doi:10.1111/dpr.12193. 
Michaelowa, Katharina, Bernhard Reinsberg and Christina Schneider (2017): The politics of 
double-delegation in the European Union, CIS Working Paper No. 93, Center for Comparative and 
International Studies, Zurich. 
16 
 
Naim, Moises (2009): Minilateralism, Foreign Policy 173: 136. 
Patrick, Stewart (2015): The new “New Multilateralism”: Minilateral cooperation, but at what cost? 
Global Summitry 1(2): 115-134. 
Patz, Ronny and Klaus Goetz (2017): Changing budgeting administration in international 
organizations, in: Michael W. Bauer, Christoph Knill and Steffen Eckhard (eds): International 
bureaucracy, Palgrave Macmillan, London: 127-150. 
Reinsberg, Bernhard (2016): The implications of multi-bi financing on multilateral agencies: The 
example of the World Bank, in: Timo Mahn, Mario Negre and Stephan Klingebiel (eds): The 
fragmentation of aid: concepts, measurements and implications for development cooperation, 
Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke: 185-198. 
Reinsberg, Bernhard (2017): Organizational reform and the rise of trust funds: Lessons from the 
World Bank, Review of International Organizations, online first, doi:10.1007/s11558-017-9268-1. 
Reinsberg, Bernhard (this issue): Trust funds as a lever of influence at international development 
organizations, Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Reinsberg, Bernhard, Katharina Michaelowa and Vera Z. Eichenauer (2015): The rise of multi-bi 
aid and the proliferation of trust funds, in: Mak Avin (ed.): Handbook on the economics of foreign 
aid, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 527-554. 
Reinsberg, Bernhard, Katharina Michaelowa and Stephen Knack (2017): Which donors, which 
funds? The choice of multilateral funds by bilateral donors at the World Bank, International 
Organization, forthcoming. 
Roger, Charles and Peter Dauvergne (2016): The rise of transnational governance as a field of 
study, International Studies Review 18 (3): 415-437. 
Squatrito, Teresa (this issue): Resourcing global justice: The resource management design of 
international courts, Global Policy, forthcoming. 
Sridhar, Devi and Ngaire Woods (2013): Trojan multilateralism: Global cooperation in health, 
Global Policy 4(4): 325-35. 
Stadelmann, Martin, Paula Castro and Axel Michaelowa (2011): Is there a leverage paradox in 
climate finance? Climate Strategies, London. 
Tortora, Piera and Suzanne Steensen (2014): Making earmarked funding more effective: Current 
practices and a way forward, Better Policies for Better Lives, Report No. 1, OECD, Paris. 
The 1818 Society (2012). The key challenges facing the World Bank President: An independent 
diagnostic, Washington. 
Weder di Mauro, Beatrice (2017): Bretton Woods und die neue Welt(un)ordnung, Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 22 April, 10. 
Westerwinter, Oliver (2016): The Politics of Informal Governance, mimeo, University of St. 
Gallen. 
World Bank (2014): World Bank trust fund databases, made available by Congressional Finance 
and Trust Fund Operations Department (accessed 10 January, 2014). 
World Bank (2017): World Development Indicators: Aid dependency, 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/6.11# (accessed 29 April, 2017). 
17 
 




Katharina Michaelowa is Professor of Political Economy and Development at the University of 
Zurich. She studied Economics at the University of Mannheim and at Delhi School of Economics. 
Before joining the University of Zurich she held positions at the OECD in Paris and at the Hamburg 
Institute of International Economics.  
i The author thanks Bernhard Reinsberg and Axel Michaelowa for helpful comments and suggestions. 
ii Author’s translation. 
iii For a recent discussion of the fungibility of aid and ways to prevent it, see Birchler, Limpach and Michaelowa (2016). 
iv Note that the overall lack of transparency does not imply that individual trust funds are necessarily non-transparent. 
As Browne (this issue) shows at the example of GAVI and the Global Fund, some of them are in fact very transparent. 
It is the multitude of funding instruments and trust funds with tailor-made rules and procedures, as well as the various 
interlinkages between funding channels, which generate the overall lack of transparency. 
                                                            
